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Abstract: Graph-based intrusion detection approaches consider the network as a graph and detect anomalies based on
graph metrics. However, most of these approaches succumb to the cluster-based behavior of the anomalies. To resolve
this problem in our study, we use flow and graph-clustering concepts to create a data set first. A new criterion related to
the average weight of clusters is then defined and a model is proposed to detect attacks based on the above-mentioned
criterion. Finally, the model is evaluated using a DARPA data set. Results show that the proposed approach detects
the attacks with high accuracy relative to methods described in previous studies.
Key words: Attack, DARPA data set, flow, graph clustering, intrusion detection

1. Introduction
Nowadays, botnets are continuously attacking networks. For network attack detection, network intrusion
detection systems were developed. To find the attacks or malicious behavior, these systems analyze the packet
contents of the network [1,2]. The packet inspection is a complicated and resource-consuming process that is
usually impossible. Thus, it is important to apply some changes to packet contents that analyze approaches.
One way that many research studies have considered this is by flow-based intrusion detection. In this approach,
the common properties of network packets are analyzed instead of the packet contents. The advantage of
flow-based approaches is that only a fraction of network data is analyzed to detect the attacks [3–5].
A flow is defined as packets that have common properties such as source and destination IP, source and
destination ports, and protocol types [6]. In addition, aggregated information about the number of packets and
bytes is concluded from the flows. Furthermore, due to the internal data dependency in the network traﬃc
and the relational nature of anomalies, graph-based approaches are crucial in detecting attacks. The nature of
anomalies is represented in a relational form, and graphs are used to show these relationships. Graph-based
approaches employ data dependency and detect attacks by using parameters in the network traﬃc graph [7–9].
1.1. Motivation
In this paper, the combination of flow-based and graph-based procedures is employed to reveal attacks. First, it
should be noted that network packets are collected to create the flows. The flows mentioned are then clustered
using a graph-clustering algorithm that is based on a genetic algorithm [10]. Furthermore, the average weight of
clusters is calculated in a time series, and some threshold points and time intervals are investigated to achieve
the most accurate detection rate of the attack.
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A first observation related to the proposed method is related to the growing number of attacks occurring
every day. Security threats and related incidents in the Internet cause several problems for its users [11].
Therefore, the introduction of new intrusion detection methods is of the utmost concern.
A second observation is related to the continuing growth of line speeds. In this situation, Internet traﬃc
grows as line speeds increase. Thus, network monitoring is a resource-consuming process when a huge volume
of network traﬃc is found in today’s networks [12].
Finally, a third observation is related to the data communications in the network, which is based on the
nature of the relational behavior of anomalies [13,14]. Thus, according to these discussed views, it is necessary
to suggest a process based on the relational behavior of the network, which is only obtained by using the flow
and graph concepts.
This paper is organized into the following sections: in Section 2, a description of related concepts and
research is introduced. Section 3 presents some preliminaries to create an appropriate overview of the network
packets. In Section 4, the suggested approach is discussed, and a criterion is defined to detect attacks based on
its values. We also provide the corresponding results in this section. Finally, Section 5 contains a conclusion
and a description of future projects.
2. Related work
First, in this section, a general overview of intrusion detection approaches is provided, followed by some related
works described in more detail. These approaches are categorized in 4 parts as follows:
1) Feature-based approaches: the key idea of these approaches is based on the concept that similar graphs
probably share common attributes such as diameter, eigenvalues, and a distribution of degree. Moreover,
these methods can be used for checking the structure of a graph in order to find patterns and explore
anomalies [15–18].
2) Decomposition-based approaches: in these approaches, tensor decomposition and graph structure are used
as an interpretation of eigenvectors and convergence of graph attributes to find the patterns, respectively
[19–23].
3) Community-based approaches: in these approaches, the main action is graph clustering. Clustering
algorithms are employed to create cluster parameters of data, and the anomalies are recognized based
on their values [24–26].
4) Window-based approaches: in this category, the evolutionary behavior of the anomalies in time intervals
reveals the patterns. Many recent research studies have also employed these methods in order to detect
the behavior of the network and whether it is a normal or malicious case [12,27].
The above-mentioned approaches can now be explained in more detail. We start with the packet content
analyzing approach [28,29], which in high-speed networks cannot be useful when considering scalability. One
of the approaches for solving this problem is the packet header-based procedure. In this phase, Mahoney et
al. [30] proposed an important method based on the packet header such that the anomalies are detected based
on the normal values for each packet header. Similarly, Manandhar et al. [31] suggested a new method using
traﬃc data in which the information of the packet header is checked out for anomaly detection. Here, it should
be mentioned that to overcome problems related to the scalability of networks, the researchers changed their
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viewpoint. by focusing more on the flow concept for intrusion detection. In this approach, the flow data are
analyzed instead of the packet contents. In 2010, a method, using time series, was proposed to detect intrusion
based on network flows [32].
The other proposed approach that used the flow concept is the work of Hellemons et al. [33]. The
study is made up of 2 parts: in the first, an algorithm is proposed for intrusion detection and, in the second
part, an initial instance of the IDS is implemented. The authors proposed an algorithm to detect a dictionary
attack, which splits attacks into 2 or more phases. The criteria used in the algorithm are packet per flow and
the minimum number of flows collected in 1-min time intervals. The threshold points are considered in each
phase of the attack; the researchers considered a dictionary attack as occurring in 3 phases: the scan phase, the
brute-force phase, and the die-oﬀ phase. By applying diﬀerent threshold points to each phase, they detected
the attack in high accuracy mode.
Graph-based intrusion detection is a type of security method that uses the properties of the network
instead of packet contents. For the first time, these systems were presented by Staniford-Chen et al. in 1996
[34]. These systems are able to detect an attack by network graph analysis and high scalability attacks such as
worms. Moreover, the implementation of this method is related to Ellis et al.’s 2006 study [35]. Some of the
graph-based methods can now be described in the following works:
Zhou et al. [36] introduced a method that uses the graph concept for implementing multivariable time
series and their relations in each time phase. In 2007, Iliofotou et al. [37] proposed an approach to monitor and
analyze network traﬃc using a traﬃc dispersion graph. They defined the traﬃc dispersion graph as the graphic
presentation of interactions among groups of nodes. The advantage of using this application is its power to
better present the structural relations of the attacks. Another approach, proposed by Le et al. [38], is based on
graph theory fundamentals such as degree of nodes, maximum degree, and similarity distance of the graph.
In addition, one of the important fields in graph-based intrusion detection is the graph-based clustering
method. In this field, Muniyandi et al. [39] used the decision tree to optimize the k-means algorithm for
intrusion detection. Furthermore, in 2012 and 2014, respectively, Mingqiang et al. [40] and Yin et al. [41] also
used graph clustering to detect network intrusions. Mingqiang et al. considered 3 sets for the normal, pending,
and anomaly clusters and placed the data in N clusters. The clusters were placed in 3 types of defined clusters
based on the rate of normal and anomaly data that had already been specified. The existing clusters in the
pending clusters were placed in one of the normal or anomaly groups using the local deviation coeﬃcient. Yin
et al. optimized this approach and used the local deviation factor instead of the local deviation coeﬃcient.
Table 1 shows a general view of the previous intrusion detection methods.
Table 1. Anomaly detection methods.

Method
Graph in time series
Dispersion graph
Using flow concept
Graph clustering and local
deviation coeﬃcient
Graph clustering and local
deviation factor
Packet heard analyzing

Data type
Flow-based
Flow-based
Flow-based

Attack
DDoS
DDoS
Dictionary

Proposed system
Graph-based
Graph-based
Flow-based

Accuracy
94.2%
100%
99%

Packet-based

DoS, Scan

Graph-based

95.3%

Packet-based

DoS, Scan

Graph-based

97.2%

Packet-based

DoS, Scan

Packet-based

95.4%
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We should mention that the flow and graph-clustering concepts in this paper are used to detect an attack
in the network such that the nodes, the edges, and the weight of edges indicate the IPs, the flows, and the
number of flows in the graph, respectively. Additionally, based on the average weight of clusters that are
reached from the graph-clustering algorithm and comparing it in several time intervals and threshold points,
the anomaly points can be detected. We expect that our approach will detect attacks with high accuracy since
it considers the data dependency in the network flows that is such an important parameter in identifying the
behavior of attacks.
3. Preliminaries
According to the studies discussed in the previous section, increasing the accuracy of the intrusion detection
approach faces restrictions in detecting some types of attacks [34]. Due to the disadvantages of the methods
discussed in previous works, an optimized approach is provided here that will enable detection rates to increase
and false alarm rates to decrease. The flow and graph-clustering concepts are used in our study to reveal attacks
with high accuracy. For more illustration, the corresponding steps are listed in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Steps of the proposed approach.

As shown in Figure 1, some data preprocessing should be done on the network traﬃc that is collected as a
packet-based data set. A packet’s headers are extracted from the packets and then, according to their common
properties, the flows are simulated in time intervals. The flows are then clustered using the graph-clustering
algorithm. In addition, the final model is created based on the new criterion to detect attacks in the time series.
Finally, the detection rate and false alarm rates are calculated by applying some time intervals and threshold
points on values of the criterion. All of these steps are explained in more detail in the next subsections.
3.1. Packet header extraction
As mentioned above, the common properties of the packets should be extracted to simulate the flows. Thus,
extracting the packet’s headers that include information about the packets is required. The information is about
source and destination IP addresses, source and destination ports, and protocol type. Some other information is
available in the packet headers; however, the headers are not usable for the flow simulation and other processes.
As an example of a packet’s headers, Figure 2 represents the properties of packets so that each row in this
figure indicates the extracted properties of one of the headers. The columns show the packet number, source
and destination IP, protocol type, the time the packets were sent, and source and destination port numbers.
In the next step, the flows should be simulated according to the categorized packets from which their headers
were extracted.
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Figure 2. Example of a packet’s headers.

3.2. Flow simulation
Based on the definition of a flow in the first section of this study [6], packets that have common properties are
collected at the same time intervals and are shown as the flows. A 7-tuple is used to show the simulated flows:
(Src IP, Dst IP, Packt, Time, Src Port, Dst Port, Prot)
All of the packets that have the same values of mentioned parameters are included in the same flow. As an
example of the flow properties, Figure 3 is presented in such a way that each row shows the mapped source and
destination IP, number of packets in the flow, the time the flow was sent, source and destination port numbers,
and the protocol type. For example, 8 packets pass through the network from IP 2 to IP 3 at 08:03:12 under
TCP protocol from port number 1036 to 1012.
3.3. Graph creation using the flows
As already known, a set of flows is provided at each time interval. These flows show several graphs at various
time points t 1 , t 2 ,. . . , t n such that the flows are the edges of the graphs and the number of flows between 2
nodes represents the weight of the edge. Therefore, the steps of graph creation from the flows are as follows:
initially, some of the time intervals are created (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n ) and the flows are included at each time interval.
Then the graphs are created using the nodes, flows, and their weights. The final graph is provided in diﬀerent
time bins using the adjacency matrix of the contained flows and nodes.
3.4. Graph clustering
After the graph creation process, a genetic-based, graph-clustering approach is introduced to create the best
clusters of flows. The steps of this algorithm are as follows:
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Figure 3. Example of flows.

Step 1: an initial population is created such that each chromosome represents a set of random numbers
that are related to the cluster’s number. It should be emphasized that the length of each chromosome is equal
to the number of graph nodes.
Step 2: the fitness function is calculated based on internal and external communications. Interval flows
are related to the flows that are in the same cluster, and external ones are the flows between clusters that are
not part of any cluster.
In order to achieve the best fitness function, the 2 parts of the communications process should be
considered. This is illustrated in Eq. (1), which indicates the number of connections between the nodes in
a cluster. It is then clear that the best clustering is attained for the high values of A i in this equation. In
this expression, µi and N i show the number of edges and nodes in the ith cluster, respectively. Therefore,
N 2i represents the total number of edges in the ith cluster, leading A i to show the probability of the internal
communication in the clusters.
Ai =

µi
Ni2

(1)

In addition, to show the external communications, it is necessary to define a parameter so that the probability
of the previously mentioned criterion is calculated. One could evaluate the number of connections between the
clusters from Eq. (2). To attain the best clustering, lower values of E ij are needed since these values occur
when the dependency among the clusters is low. As a result of this, independent clusters are created, meaning
that the best clustering has been implemented. εij and 2N i N j represent the number of edges from the ith to
the jth cluster and the maximum number of edges between 2 clusters, respectively.
{
Eij =

0
εij
2Ni Nj

if
if

i=j
i ̸= j

(2)

Hence, E ij shows the degree of dependency from the ith to the jth cluster. The final objective function is
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achieved based on Eq. (3). In this equation, k represents the number of nodes in the graph, and the probability
of internal connections cancels out the external ones.

k
k
∑
∑

Eij
Ai

i,j=1
i=1
−
∀k > 1
MQ =
(3)
k(k−1)
k

2

Ai
k=1
Step 3: after calculating the fitness function, the selection process of the genetic algorithm is performed to select
the best population.
Step 4: a 2-point crossover and swap mutation are applied to the population in order to add other
individuals.
Step 5: the next population generation is created using the replacement action of the genetic algorithm.
After performing all of above-mentioned preliminaries, a cluster-based data set is available such that some
criteria are defined, and an anomaly can be detected based on their values in the time series. An example of
the proposed data set is provided in Figure 4. Some important properties of the cluster-based data set such as
time interval, the number of clusters, the number of cluster nodes, internal and external packets, and internal
and external flows are calculated.

Figure 4. Part of a cluster-based data set.

4. Proposed approach
In this section, a criterion is proposed to detect attacks based on its values in the time series. This criterion
should have diﬀerent values in the normal and anomaly conditions of the network. Based on this fact, in this
paper, the flow and cluster concepts are used to define the best criterion as the behavior of the network can be
analyzed by the combination of these concepts. Also, after creating the flows and then performing the graphclustering algorithm on the flow-based data set, a cluster-based one is created. Therefore, the criterion should
consider the internal and external of properties of the clusters and the number of clusters in the emerged data
set. The proposed criterion is deduced from Eq. (4), such that AveW, W i , ExtW i , and N represent the average
weight of clusters, total weight and external weight of the ith cluster, and the number of clusters, respectively.
Accordingly, we believe that in the attack condition, the value of the proposed criterion changes over time. To
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prove this claim, a DARPA data set is used to evaluate the proposed approach. Many recent papers [42–46]
used DARPA data sets that included packet-based network traﬃc. These data consist of 7 weeks of network
traﬃc and 5 types of attacks: DoS, scan, local access, user to root, and data. Table 2 shows the number and
types of attacks in each categorized attack. A brief description of these attacks is provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Various attack descriptions.

Attack type
DoS
Scan
Local access
User to root
Data

Description
Denial of service; an attempt to make a network resource unavailable to its intended
users: temporarily interrupt services of a host connected to the Internet
A process that sends client requests to a range of server port addresses on a host to
find an active port
The attacker has an account on the system in question and can use that account to
attempt unauthorized tasks
Attackers access a user account on the system and are able to exploit some vulnerability to gain root access to the system
Attackers involve someone performing an action that they may be able to do on a
given computer system, but that they are not allowed to do according to policy

∑N
i=1

(Wi ) − (

AveW =

N
∑

i=1

N

ExtW i )/N
(4)

According to the proposed criterion and the mentioned data set, the final model of attack detection can be
created. More specifically, the cluster-based data are given as input to the model, and then the proposed
criterion is calculated in the time series so that the normal and anomaly points are detected based on defined
threshold points. Furthermore, diﬀerent threshold points are investigated in the time series to identify the best
one. The best threshold point is extracted from the detection rates of the suggested way during several time
intervals. The threshold point and time interval parameters are explained in more detail in the next subsection.
4.1. Time interval and threshold point selection
The 2 parameters discussed above, i.e. the time interval and threshold point, are important criteria for arriving
at the maximum detection rate in the proposed approach. The time interval is used to separate the data set
into equal time bins. This is done to ensure that each step is performed and, therefore, that the criterion is
calculated. Moreover, the threshold points are also constant values that identify the attack and the normal
cases. If the value of the criterion is less (more) than the threshold point then the network is in the normal
(anomaly) case.
Accordingly, the network traﬃc is separated into equal intervals of 20, 40, 60, and 90 s, and the steps of
our method are implemented in each time bin. The time series of the criterion are then created. To be more
specific, the time series of 20 s includes t 1 , t 2 ,. . . , t n intervals in a way that t i represents the ith 20 s of the
network traﬃc. It should be mentioned that all of these intervals are tested in the final model.
For each time series, 4 threshold points are considered to identify their normal and anomaly points. The
threshold points are tested at every time interval, and the evaluation rates are correspondingly determined for
them. Tables 3–6 show the results for diﬀerent values of the mentioned parameters. Table 3 represents the
results of a 20-s time window. In such a case, the threshold points are 20, 35, 50, and 65 s. In each row of this
table, 5 evaluation rates are calculated: true and false positive, true and false negative, and the detection rate.
These parameters are defined as follow:
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Table 3. True and false rates in a 20-s time window.

Threshold
point
> 20
> 35
> 50
> 65

False
positive
0.153
0.043
0.036
0.078

True
positive
0.990
0.961
0.972
0.928

False
positive
0.010
0.039
0.028
0.072

True
positive
0.847
0.957
0.964
0.922

Detection
rate
0.918
0.959
0.968
0.925

Table 4. True and false rates in a 40-s time window.

Threshold
point
> 30
> 45
> 60
> 80

False
positive
0.088
0.041
0.074
0.079

True
positive
0.905
0.970
0.945
0.938

False
positive
0.095
0.030
0.055
0.062

True
positive
0.912
0.959
0.926
0.921

Detection
rate
0.908
0.964
0.935
0.929

Table 5. True and false rates in a 60-s time window.

Threshold
point
> 40
> 60
> 80
> 100

False
positive
0.055
0.032
0.017
0.024

True
positive
0.910
0.944
0.958
0.907

False
positive
0.090
0.056
0.042
0.093

True
positive
0.945
0.968
0.983
0.976

Detection
rate
0.927
0.956
0.970
0.941

Table 6. True and false rates in a 90-s time window.

Threshold
point
> 50
> 70
> 90
> 120

False
positive
0.172
0.046
0.067
0.058

True
positive
0.990
0.955
0.988
0.937

False
positive
0.010
0.045
0.012
0.063

True
positive
0.828
0.954
0.933
0.942

Detection
rate
0.909
0.954
0.960
0.939

True positive: an attack has occurred, and an alarm is produced.
False positive: no attack has occurred, but an alarm is produced.
True negative: no attack has occurred, and no alarm is produced.
False negative: an attack has occurred, but no alarm is produced for it.
Detection rate: calculated by dividing the number of detected attacks into the number of total attacks.
As shown in Table 3, the threshold point at 50 has a higher detection rate relative to other points. If
the detection rate is considered as the main evaluation parameter, then it can be concluded that 50 is the best
threshold point for a 20-s interval. However, the threshold point at 20 has the highest true positive rate, and the
threshold at 50 has the lowest false positive rate. These are good point parameters for these threshold points;
however, as was discussed previously, the essential parameter is the detection rate. As a result, 50 is identified
as the best threshold point for the 20-s interval.
The same analysis is deduced from other time windows and threshold points. Table 4 is related to the
40-s time interval at threshold points of 30, 45, 60, and 80. The best threshold point for this time bin is 45
since it has the maximum detection rate value. In Table 5, the time interval is 60 s, and the threshold points
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are 40, 60, 80, and 100. Here, the threshold point of 80 is the best one. Table 6 also shows the time interval at
90 s with 50, 70, 90, and 120 considered threshold points. The best threshold point here is 90.
As a final investigation, the results of Tables 3–6 are shown in Table 7. This table selects the best
threshold point in each time interval and then includes all of the evaluation values of the mentioned parameters.
As shown, the 60-s time interval at the threshold point of 80 has the highest detection rate relative to other time
intervals and threshold points. Therefore, the values of the parameters (time interval = 60, threshold point =
80) are considered the best values for testing the network traﬃc in both normal and anomaly cases.
Table 7. Comparison of the 4 best time intervals.

Time
interval
20
40
60
90

Threshold
point
> 50
> 45
> 80
> 90

False
positive
0.036
0.041
0.017
0.067

True
positive
0.972
0.970
0.958
0.988

False
positive
0.028
0.030
0.042
0.012

True
positive
0.964
0.959
0.983
0.933

Detection
rate
0.968
0.964
0.970
0.960

In Table 8, the detection rate of all possible attack types in the data set is represented in the best
condition of the mentioned parameters. As shown in this table, the maximum detection is achieved in DoS and
user to root attacks.
Table 8. Detection rate of types of attacks in the 60-s time window and at a threshold of 80.

Attack type
Detection rate

DoS
0.882

Scan
0.625

Local access
0.529

User to root
0.928

Data
0.527

Total
0.970

4.2. Comparison
In this section, our approach is compared to procedures that do not use graph-clustering and flow concepts.
As mentioned in the final model, the proposed criterion is related to the clustered data set. The evaluation
parameters are calculated for each case: before and after clustering. Table 9 shows this comparison using the
mentioned parameters. As shown in this table, using the clustering approach leads to higher detection rates
relative to the approaches that do not use the clustering algorithm such that the detection rate after clustering
is 0.970. However, it is 0.877 in the best condition without clustering.
Table 9. Comparison of the intrusion detection method before and after the clustering method.

Method
After clustering
Before clustering

False positive
0.017
0.089

True positive
0.958
0.485

False negative
0.042
0.515

True negative
0.983
0.911

Detection rate
0.970
0.877

In Table 10, the proposed approach is compared to other intrusion detection systems. The evaluation
parameter for comparisons is the number of 100% detected attacks, i.e. the detection rate is 100%. As shown
in this table, the number of detected attacks in the data set is 43, while it is 10 and 32 for both the Cisco and
Snort systems. This indicates that the performance of the proposed approach in detecting attacks.
To be more specific, Snort is a rule-based intrusion detection system. It combines the advantages of
signature- and anomaly-based inspection methods to reveal attacks. Snort can accurately detect threats at high
speeds. With nearly 4 million downloads and hundreds of thousands of registered users, it is the most widely
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Table 10. Comparison of attacks detection.

Method
Our approach
Cisco
Snort

DoS
15
3
9

Scan
5
1
4

Local access
9
5
13

User to root
13
1
5

Data
1
0
1

Total
43
10
32

deployed IDS in the world. Cisco IDS is also a network-based intrusion detection system that uses a database
to control intrusion alarms in which a sensor platform monitors the network and a director platform provides a
single GUI management interface for users.
4.3. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, a new approach has been proposed to detect attacks using a graph-clustering algorithm. A new
criterion is defined based on the internal and external weight of clusters. We have determined that attacks are
detected by the diﬀerent values of the proposed criterion. In addition, the threshold points and time intervals
are considered to evaluate the suggested procedure to achieve the maximum detection rate. Results from the
DARPA data set indicate that the proposed model detects the attacks in the network flows with high accuracy.
For future consideration, we recommend creating probability models such as Markov models, which are based
on the mentioned parameters, to achieve high detection rate accuracy. Also, the definition of new criteria can
be an appropriate option to provide high performance intrusion detection approaches.
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